Hitler was right
Numerous histories of the titanic 1940s armed struggle between Germany and the Soviet Union have been presented to the mainstream reading public over the last half century or so, and for the most part they follow the same
pattern: Germany, led by its mad, greedy for conquest Führer, made a surprise attack on the
USSR. The Germans made many quick gains and easy victories over an unsuspecting Russian
foe. But as the Russians recovered from their initial surprise, they marshaled their unlimited resources in manpower and factory production and fought back, gradually forcing the invaders back across the frontiers and ultimately defeating the Nazi menace pretty much
single-handed. The Germans became weaker in all areas while the Russians grew ever
stronger, making the former's defeat inevitable. The western Allies helped, but it was the Russians who overwhelmingly defeated the Nazi
menace. So goes the received script.
Those few historians contradicting this received script have found themselves and their work branded as
'controversial' and their theses and ideas generally rejected or treated with
contempt. John Mosier is one such, whose recent works The Myth of the Great War, The Blitzkrieg
Myth, and Cross of Iron have consistently established the point that deeper and more objective research reveals a quite different
reality. The surprises are many. Instead of a mad dictator greedy to conquer the world and making endless
blunders, Hitler is presented as a sane and rational man making sensible and very smart
decisions, understanding strategy and global politics far better than his
generals. Instead of a surprise attack on the innocent Russians, Mosier has concluded that the war was a pre-emptive strike on a predator poised to invade Germany and Europe. The very idea of assigning real blame for the war to the Soviets instead of to Hitler flies in the face of too many
verities, and is usually treated as a taboo.
A common tendency of German generals after the war was to go along with many of these
assumptions. They sought to distance themselves from Hitler and National
Socialism, presenting him as a sort of pied piper who misled and then forced them into the war. According to this self-serving
version, all the things that went wrong were due to Hitler's crazy decisions and
meddlings, while all that went right were as a result of the genius of the generals
themselves. The objective was firstly to protect their own reputations, secondly to protect the image of the German General
Staff, and thirdly to simply survive in post-war Germany and shore up their relationship with the
conquerors, particularly the USA, which
occupied - and arguably continues to occupy -
defeated Germany.
Mosier points out that in nearly all cases, Hitler was right
in his decisions while his generals were wrong. The German officer caste was trained to seize major cities and especially
capitals, but Hitler understood that modern wars were more economic in
nature - conflicts to seize resources both to deny the enemy the ability to wage war while at the same time increasing one's own ability to do so. The author states that Hitler's generals simply could not comprehend this
view.
His analysis of the Stalin-inspired Soviet myths is replete with a careful study of both German and Russian
records. In his view, the German records are quite accurate and were kept in painstaking detail. Far from a German military growing weaker in both manpower and armor etc. year by
year, he demonstrates that it progressively grew stronger in troops, armor, in all forms of effective
firepower, and in quality of leadership both tactical and strategic. The Russian
resources, presented as limitless and leaping in strength, were steadily
diminishing. Their troops were perishing in the tens of millions thanks to Stalin's orders for continual frontal attacks
everywhere, while their armor was being steadily 'shredded' by German firepower and
tactics. Even the official Soviet statistics of losses and production figures reveal many inconsistencies and anomalies which when coupled with his examination of the far more accurate German
figures, enabled Mosier to provide a truer picture of what was happening.
What is revealed is that the casualties on both sides reflected a ratio of about 5:1 favoring the German
forces. With a USSR population of about 170 million at that time and a German population of close to 100
million, the Russians could not long sustain a ratio of greater than 2:1. In other
words, the attrition rate was bleeding Russia dry in manpower. Hitler understood this and wisely strove to continue the
process. Hence his 'stand fast' orders in 1941 and later, causing further attritive combats resulting in tremendous disparities in
losses, again favoring Germany.
Armor and firepower production and usage are carefully
examined. Mosier shows that while the Soviets claimed wildly huge tank production
figures, not only were the real figures much lower, but the tanks themselves had endless
problems. Their operational life was often measured in days or even hours before breakdowns and failures would
occur. The Russians produced tanks but not much in the way of spare parts. They produced no recovery vehicles at all, and workshop and repair facilities were almost
unknown. The German armor was usually higher in quality and was maintained well, damaged vehicles being quickly recovered and put back into
service. The disparities in performance on the battlefield were not much different from the manpower-loss
ratios.
Mosier provides a study of other forms of mobile German firepower which strictly speaking were not normally classified as
'armor' as their guns could only be elevated and lowered, lacking moveable
turrets. Assault guns, self-propelled artillery, mobile anti-aircraft guns, tank
destroyers, and other new weapons were produced in ever greater quantities and deployed in independent units assigned to support infantry or to supplement the panzer
divisions. Sometimes rejected by panzer generals, e.g., Guderian and
others, as an unwelcome innovation, they were nonetheless tremendously successful in destroying many thousands of Soviet tanks and breaking up troop
concentrations, stalling major Soviet offensives time and again while further amplifying the aforesaid losses
ratios.
The author shows that the German troops and officers were well-trained and got better at tactics and strategy as the war
progressed, while Soviet troops and officers generally remained poorly trained and prepared and even more poorly led. Mosier frankly presents the Soviet military as generally
incompetent, continuing to take huge losses and suffer countless major and minor defeats right up to the end of the war. He also takes aim at the reputations of Soviet Marshals
Zhukov, Koniev, and others, seeing them as certainly overrated as well as rather dishonest in their own memoirs of the war.
So how could the Soviets have won the war then? Mosier shows
how, firstly, the USSR received tremendous amounts of lend-lease and other forms of aid from the USA and
Britain. Trucks, aircraft, American tanks, fuel oils, food, all was amply, even hugely provided to the Soviets and indeed saved them from destruction at the hands of the
Germans - all contrary to the Stalinist myth that said aid was insignificant and played little or no role in the Red Army's defeat of the Wehrmacht.
Secondly, in spite of Stalin's repeated demands for an Allied 'second front' to take the pressure off
Russia, in point of fact several such fronts were already draining Germany's
resources - a second front in the air over Germany
itself, a third front in the Battle of the Atlantic, a fourth front in the war in North Africa and then Sicily and
Italy - all before the fifth front D-Day invasion of France in June 1944.
The author conclusively shows that what really gave the Soviets the edge was the steady switching of Germany's best units from the eastern front to other theatres in the west, to the Balkans, to France, to
Italy, and elsewhere, in response to real or expected threats from the
Allies, units including the famed 'Grossdeutschland' division, the 'Leibstandarte' and other leading SS
divisions, and other units possessing the best equipment. The Wehrmacht was ultimately stripped of the firepower it needed in the east and its role then became largely defensive. The Soviet myth of a rock-solid Red Army steadily and victoriously pushing the Germans back
everywhere, falls flat on its face in Mosier's analysis.
Operation Zitadelle in summer 1943 - also known as the Battle of
Kursk - was the last major German offensive in the
east. Hitler ordered disengagement at a point where some German generals believed they were poised at a major breakthrough and
victory - again in order to switch units to meet threats elsewhere away from
Russia. Mosier regards this as an unusual error on Hitler's part, but a decision or set of decisions entirely rational and
understandable.
Germany's failure to develop and mass-produce a strategic bomber in
Mosier's view spelled doom for the war against Stalin.
However, he makes clear that Germany very nearly completely defeated the Soviets without it in 1941, and that it was mainly only the very generous aid from the USA that enabled the USSR to survive at all, thus that without such a bomber the war would likely have been won by Germany
anyway.
He believes that the partisan war in Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus was little more than a nuisance to the Germans and never constituted a major
threat. In this regard he points out that most of the Soviet civilian losses during the war were a direct result of Stalin's orders and not German actions per se, as he commanded uprisings and reprisals everywhere behind the
lines, most of which were snuffed out by German forces with few losses to themselves but major losses to the
Russians.
An interesting and unique conclusion drawn by the author is that the Soviet Union's gigantic manpower losses and physical destruction suffered during the war, ultimately led to the collapse of communism in that country several decades
later. If this is so, then Adolf Hitler is the man or agent to be credited with that seminal
event. But at the very least, he did in fact prevent most of Europe from being overrun by Stalin's henchmen in
1941 - something which almost no one today is willing to
admit. |