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History
of Revisionism as of 1993
Yoshua Shalev
APPENDIX I
E. L. Van Roden, "American Atrocities in Germany", The Progressive, February 1949, p. 21f.
American Atrocities in Germany
By JUDGE EDWARD L. VAN RODEN
AMERICAN investigators at the U. S. Court in Dachau, Germany, used the following methods
to obtain confessions: Beatings and brutal kickings. Knocking out teeth and breaking
jaws. Mock trials. Solitary confinement. Posturing as priests. Very limited
rations. Spiritual deprivation. Promises of acquittal. Complaints concerning these third degree methods were received by Secretary of the Army Kenneth Royall last Spring. Royall appointed Justice Gordon Simpson of the Texas Supreme Court and me to go to Germany and check up on the
reports. Accompanied by Lt. Col. Charles Lawrence. Jr., we went to
Munich, Germany, set up offices there, and heard a stream of testimony about the way in which American atrocities were
committed.
But first, a bit of the background. Last Spring the Supreme Court refused the habeas corpus
petition of Col. Willis N. Everett. Jr., an American lawyer, who had served as defense counsel for the 74 Germans accused in the famous Malmedy
case. Everett is a very able lawyer, a conscientious and sincere
gentleman. He is not a fanatic.
In his petition. Everett charged that the Germans had not received a fair
trial. Everett did not claim that all the German defendants were
innocent, but since they did not have a fair trial, there was no way of telling the innocent from the
guilty.
The tragedy is that so many of us Americans, having fought and won the war with so much
sweat and blood, now say. "All Germans should be punished". We won the war, but some of us want to go on
killing. That seems to me wicked.
If Everett's shocking charges were true, they would be a blot on the American conscience for
eternity. The fact that there were atrocities by the Germans during the war against
Americans, or by Americans against Germans, would not in the least lessen our disgrace if such peacetime atrocities were to go
unchallenged.
Our specific assignment was not only to examine Col. Everett's charges, but also to examine the cases of the 139 death
sentences, which at that time remained unexecuted: 152 Germans had already been
executed.
The 139 doomed men who were still alive fell into three groups. They were accused of
involvement in the Dachau concentration camp crimes, in the killing of American
fliers, or in the Malmedy massacres. Let me say that I believe the crimes for which these Germans were tried actually took
place, and that some Germans were guilty of them.
But we should not let the indiscriminate hate of all Germans that was generated during and after the war, blind us to the necessity of punishing the guilty ones
only.
After this investigation, and after talking to all sides, I do not believe that the German people knew what the German Government was
doing. I am convinced the German populace had no idea what diabolical crimes that
arch-fiend, Himmler, was committing in the concentration camps. From theatrocities we learned
about, he must have been the very prince of devils.
But as for the Germans at large, they fought the war as loyal citizens with a fatherland to
support, and a fatherland to defend.
Some American fliers, shot down on bombing raids over Germany, were killed by German
civilians.
These Germans felt that the American fliers were the murderers of their defenseless
wives, mothers, and children who were In the bombed cities, – just as the English felt that German fliers were their
murderers. That's war.
I felt deeply about these fliers. I had two sons in the Air Force. Jimmy made 35 missions over Germany and returned
safe, thank God! Dick made 32 Missions and was finally shot down over
Italy. He spent 12 months in a German prisoner-of-war camp and was fairly well
treated. He is now in a sanitarium in Arizona recovering from TB he contracted in the camp.
II
The Malmedy massacres, in which a group of American prisoners of war were mown down after
being captured during the Battle of the Bulge, actually happened. But can't we distinguish between the assertion that these atrocities did
happen, and the assertion that they were committed by these 74 Germans who had been in or near Malmedy at that time?
Because some wicked sadistic German individuals did it, are we doing the right thing by saying any and all Germans we lay our hands on are guilty and should be
destroyed? I personally don't believe that. That's not the way of thinking I learnt in my church, or you learned in your church.
On Russian insistence, the Americans couldn't retry these men. The Russian philosophy in these matters is that the investigators determine the guilt or innocence of the
accused, and the judge merely sets the sentence. We accepted the Russian formula of
no-retrial, but we won out on the presumption of innocence before
trial.
The American prohibition of hear-say evidence had been suspended. Second and third-hand
testimony was admitted, although the Judge Advocate General warned against the value of hearsay
evidence, especially when it was obtained, as this was. two or three years after the
act. Lt. Col. Ellis and Lt Perl of the Prosectution pleaded that it was difficult to obtain competant
evidence. Perl told the court, "We had a tough case to crack and we had to use persuasive
methods." He admitted to the court that the persuasive methods included various
"expedients, including some violence and mock trials." He further told the court that the cases rested on statements obtained by such
methods.
The statements which were admitted as evidence were obtained from men who had first been kept in solitary confinement for
three, four, and, five months. They were confined between four walls, with no
windows, and no opportunity of exercise. Two meals a day were shoved in to them through a slot in the
door. They were not allowed to talk to anyone. They had no communication with their families or any minister or priest during that time.
This solitary confinement proved sufficient in itself in some cases to persuade the Germans to sign prepared
statements. These statements not only involved the signer, but often would involve other
defendants.
III
Our investigators would put a black hood over the accused's head and then punch him in the face with brass
knuckles, kick him, and beat him with rubber hose. Many of the German defendants had teeth knocked out. Some had their jaws
broken.
All but two of the Germans, in the 139 cases we investigated, had been kicked in the testicles beyond
repair. This was Standard Operating Procedure with American
investigators. Perl admitted use of mock trials and persuasive methods including violence and said the court was free to decide the weight to be attached to evidence thus
received. But it all went in.
One 18 year old defendant, after a series of beatings. was writing a statement being dictated to
him. When they reached the 16th page, the boy was locked up for the
night. In the early morning, Germans in nearby cells heard him
muttering. "I will not utter another lie." When the jailer came in later to get him to finish his false
statement, he found the German hanging from a cell bar, dead. However the statement that the German had hanged himself to escape signing was offered and received in evidence in the trial of the
others.
Sometimes a prisoner who refused to sign was led into a dimly lit room, where a group of
civilian investigators, wearing U. S. Army uniforms. were seated around a black table with a crucifix in the center and two candles
burning, one on each aide. "You will now have your American trial," the defendant was
told.
The sham court passed a sham sentence of death. Then the accused was
told, "You will hang in a few days, as soon as the general approves this
sentence: but in the meantime sign this confession and we can get you
acquitted." Some still wouldn't sign.
We were shocked by the crucifix being used so mockingly.
In another case, a bogus Catholic priest (actually an investigator) entered the cell of one of the
defendants, heard his confession, gave him absolution, and then gave him a little friendly
tip: "Sign whatever the investigators ask you to sign. It will get you your
freedom. Even though it's false, I can give you absolution now in advance for the lie you'd
tell."
Our final report on these trials has been turned over to Secretary of the Army
Royall. In spite of the many instances like those I have described, we found no general conspiracy to obtain evidence
improperly. With the exception of 29 cases, we saw no reason why the executions should not be carried out. For the 110
others, there was sufficient competent evidence from other sources to warrant the death
penalty, exclusive of the evidence obtained by the third-degree.
The 29 men whose sentences we recommended for commutation certainly did not have a fair trial by American
standards. Twenty-seven of them were to have their terms reduced to life, one of them was to get 10
years, and one would get two and one-half years, according to our
recommendations. We also recommended a permanent program of clemency for reconsideration of the sentences of other prisoners convicted in war crimes
cases.
Secretary Royall has saved our national conscience. Could we as Americans ever have held our heads up if he hadn't looked into
it? He has saved our national prestige and our international
reputation.
However, in spite of Secretary Royall's action in this matter, there is little real room for complacency on the part of
Americans. Rather our report reveals, by implication, that we still have a serious situation in Germany to clear up.
Moreover, five of the men for whom we recommended commutations have been hanged since we turned in our
report. In all 100 of the 139 we set out to investigate are now dead.
IV
The American investigators who committed the atrocities in the name of American Justice and
under the American flag are going scot-free. At this point there are two objectives which should be aimed
for:
Those prisoners whose death sentences have not been commuted and who have not yet been
hanged should be saved, pending full judicial review.
American investigators who abused the powers of victory and prostituted justice to
vengeance, should be exposed in a public process, preferably in the U. S., and
prosecuted.
Unless these crimes committed by Americans are exposed by us at home, the prestige of America and American justice will suffer permanent and irreparable
damage. We can partially atone for our own misconduct if we first search it out and publicly condemn and disavow it. If we wait for our enemies to blazon our guilt
abroad, we can only bow our heads in shamed admission.
------
EDWARD L. VAN RODEN, a Pennsylvania judge, served in World War I and II, in the latter as
Chief of the Military Justice Division for the European Theater where he saw service in
Normandy, Belgium, the Rhineland, the Battle of the Bulge, and in the Ardennes. In 1946 he was reassigned to active duty and served on several important court martial trials in Germany. In 1948 Secretary of the Army Royall appointed him to an extraordinary commission charged with investigating the Dachau War Crimes
program.
======================
Appendices II to V are extracts from Jean-Claude PRESSAC, Auschwitz: Technique and Operation of the Gas Chambers, Beate Klarsfeld Foundation, New York, 1989.
======================
APPENDIX VI
Memorandum of Martin Luther to Joachim von Ribbentrop, August 21, 1942 (NG-2586-J, in NMT, Volume XIII, pp. 243-249)
The principle of the German Jewish policy after the seizure of power consisted in promoting
with all means the Jewish emigration. For this purpose in 1939 Field Marshall Goering in his capacity as Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan established a Reich Central Office for Jewish Emigration and the direction was given to SS Lieutenant General Heydrich in his capacity as chief of the Security Police. The Foreign Office is represented in the committee of the Reich Central Office. The draft of a letter to that effect to the Chief of the Security Police was approved by the Reich Foreign Minister as 83/24 B in February 1939.
The present war gives Germany the opportunity and also the duty of solving the Jewish problem in Europe. In consideration of the favorable course of the war against France, D III
(department Germany III) proposed in July 1940 as a solution – the removal of all Jews from Europe and the demanding of the Island of Madagascar from France as a territory for the reception of the
Jews. The Reich Foreign Minister has basically agreed to the beginning of the preliminary work for the deportation of the Jews from Europe. This should be done in close cooperation with the offices of the Reichsfuehrer-SS
(compare D III 200/40).
The Madagascar plan was enthusiastically accepted by the RSHA which in the opinion of the
Foreign Office is the agency which alone is in the position technically and by experience to carry out a Jewish evacuation on a large scale and to guarantee the supervision of the people
evacuated, the competent agency of the RSHA thereupon worked out a plan going into detail for the evacuation of the Jews to Madagascar and for their settlement
there. This plan was approved by the Reichsfuehrer-SS. SS Lieutenant General Heydrich submitted this plan directly to the Reich Foreign Minister in August 1940
(compare D III 2171). The Madagascar plan in fact had been outdated as the result of the political
development.
The fact that the Fuehrer intends to evacuate all Jews from Europe was communicated to me as early as August 1940 by Ambassador Abetz after an interview with the Fuehrer
(compare D III 2298).
Hence the basic instruction of the Reich Foreign Minister, to promote the evacuation of the Jews in closest cooperation with the agencies of the
Reichsfuehrer-SS, is still in force and will therefore be observed by D III.
The administration of the occupied territories brought with it the problem of the treatment of Jews living in these
territories. First, the military commander in France saw himself compelled as the first one to issue on 27 September 1940 a decree on the treatment of the Jews in occupied France. The decree was issued with the agreement of the German Embassy in Paris. The pertinent instruction was issued directly by the Reich Foreign Minister to Ambassador Abetz on the occasion of a verbal
report.
After the pattern of the Paris decree similar decrees have been issued in the Netherlands and
Belgium. As these decrees, in the same way as German laws concerning
Jews, formally embrace all Jews independent of their citizenship objections were made by foreign
powers, among others protest notes by the Embassy of the United States of America, although the military commander in France through internal regulation had ordered that the Jewish measures should not be applied to the citizens of neutral
countries.
The Reich Foreign Minister has decided in the case of the American protests that he does not consider it right to have military regulations issued for making an exception of the American
Jews. It would be a mistake to reject objections of friendly states (Spain and
Hungary) and on the other hand to allow weakness toward the Americans. The Reich Foreign Minister considers it necessary to make these instructions to the Field commanders retroactive
(compare D III 5449).
In accordance with this direction the Jewish measures have been given general
application.
In his letter of 24 June 1940 – Pol XII 136 – SS Lieutenant General Heydrich informed the
Reich Foreign Minister that the whole problem of the approximately three and a quarter million Jews in the areas under German control can no longer be solved by emigration – a territorial final solution would be
necessary.
In recognition of this Reich Marshall Goering on 31 July 1941 commissioned SS Lieutenant
General Heydrich to make, in conjunction with the interested German Control
agencies, all necessary preparations for a total Solution of the Jewish problem in the German sphere of influence in Europe
(compare D III 709 secret). On the basis of this instruction, SS Lieutenant General Heydrich arranged a conference of all the interested German agencies for 20 January 1942, at which the State Secretaries were present from the other ministries and I myself from the Foreign Office. In the conference General Hey[d]rich explained that Reich Marshall Goering's assignment to him had been made on the Fuehrer's instruction and that the Fuehrer instead of the emigration had now authorized the evacuation of the Jews to the East as the solution
(compare page 5 of the enclosure to D III 29/42 Secret). State Secretary Weizsaecker had been informed on the
conference; for the time being the Reich Foreign Minister had not been informed on the
conference, because SS Lieutenant General Heydrich agreed to holding a new conference in the near future in which more details of the total solution should be
discussed. This conference has never taken place due to Lieutenant General Heydrich's appointment as acting Reich Protector of Bohemia and Moravia and due to his
death.
In the conference on 20 January 1942 I demanded that all questions concerned with countries
outside Germany must first have the agreement of the Foreign Office, a demand to which SS Lieutenant General Heydrich agreed and also has faithfully complied
with, as in fact, the office of the RSHA handling Jewish matters has from the beginning carried out all measures in frictionless cooperation with the Foreign Office. The RSHA has in this matter proceeded indeed almost over
cautiously.
On the basis of the Fuehrer's instruction mentioned under 4 (above), the evacuation of the Jews from Germany was
begun. It was urged that at the same time these Jews should also be taken who were nationals of the countries which had also undertaken Jewish
measures. The RSHA accordingly made an inquiry of the Foreign Office. For reasons of
courtesy, inquiry was made by way of the German legations in Bratislava
(Slovakia), Zagreb (Croatia), and Bucharest (Rumania) to the governments there as to whether they wanted to recall their Jews from Germany in due time or to agree to their deportation to the ghettos in the East. To the issuance of this instruction agreement was given before dispatch by the State
Secretary, the Under State Secretary in Charge of the Political Division, the Director of the Division for Economic Policy and the Director of the Legal Division
(compare D III 336 Secret).
The German Legation in Bucharest reports with reference to D III 602 Secret, that the Rumanian Government would leave it to the Reich Government to deport their Jews along with the German Jews to the ghettos in the East. They are not interested in having the Rumanian Jews return to
Rumania.
The Legation in Zagreb has informed us that the Croat Government expresses gratitude for the gesture of the German Government; but it would appreciate the deportation of its Jews to the East
(compare D III 624 Secret).
The Legation in Bratislava reported with reference to D III 661 Secret that the Slovak
Government is fundamentally in agreement with the deportation to the eastern
ghettos. But the Slovak claims to the property of these Jews should not be
endangered.
The wire reports have also been submitted, as customary, to the Reich Foreign Minister's
Bureau.
On the basis of the reports of the Ministers I have informed the RSHA with reference to D III 661 Secret that the Jews of
Rumanian. Croat, and Slovak nationality could also be deported; their property should be
blocked. The Director[s] of the Political Division, Section IV of the Political Division, Section IX of the Legal Division and Section IV of the Division for the Economic Policy have cosigned the
document. Accordingly, the deportations of the Jews from the occupied territories was
undertaken.
The number of Jews deported in this way to the East did not suffice to cover the labor needs
there. The RSHA therefore, acting on the instruction of the Reichsfuehrer-SS approached the Foreign Office to ask the Slovak Government to make 20,000
young, strong Slovak Jews from Slovakia available for deportation to the East. The German Legation in Bratislava was
provided, by D III 874, with proper instruction. The instruction was signed by the State
Secretary, the Under State Secretary in charge of the Political Division, and Section IV of the Political Division.
The Legation in Bratislava reported re D III 1002 that the Slovak Government has taken up the suggestion
eagerly; the preparatory work could be begun.
Following up this pleased concurrence of the Slovak Government, the Reichsfuehrer-SS
proposed that the rest of the Slovak Jews also be deported to the East and Slovakia thereby be made free of
Jews. The Legation was, re D III 1559 Aug. 11, provided with proper
instruction. The draft of the instruction was signed by the State
Secretary: after its dispatch it was submitted for their information to the bureau of the Reich foreign Minister and the Under State Secretary in charge of the Political Division.
As the Slovak Episcopacy meanwhile raised objections to the deportation of the Jews before the Slovak Government the instruction carries the express statement that in no case must there develop internal political difficulties on account of the evacuation of the Jews in
Slovakia. By the telegraphic report, re D III 2006 the Legation reported that the Slovak Government, without any German
pressure, has declared itself agreeable to the deportation of all Jews and that the State President agreed personally to the
deportation. The telegraphic record was submitted to the bureau of the Reich Foreign Minister. The
Slovak Government has furthermore agreed that it will pay as a contribution to the cost entailed DM 500 for every evacuated Jew.
In the meantime 52,000 Jews have been removed from Slovakia. Due to church influences and
the corruption of individual officials 35,000 Jews have received a special
legitimation. However, Minister President Tuka wants the Jewish removal continued and therefore has asked for support through diplomatic pressure by the Reich
(compare D III 3865). The Ambassador is authorized to give this diplomatic help in that he may state to State President Dr. Tiso that the exclusion of the 35,000 Jews is a surprise in Germany, the more so since the cooperation of Slovakia up to now in the Jewish problem has been highly appreciated
here. This instruction has been cosigned by the Under State Secretary in charge of the Political Division, and the State
Secretary.
The Croat Government is likewise fundamentally agreeable to the removal of the Jews from
Croatia. It especially considers the deportation of the four to five thousand Jews from the Italian occupied Second Zone (centered around Dubrovnik and Mostar) to be important, as they represent a political burden and their elimination would serve the general pacification. The removal can of course take place only with German aid, as difficulties are to be expected from the Italian side. There have been practical examples of
resistance to the Croat measures by Italian officials on behalf of well-to-do Jews. Furthermore the Italian Chief of Staff in Mostar has said that he cannot approve the removal since all the people living in Mostar have been assured of the same treatment.
Since meanwhile according to a telephone communication from Zagreb, the Croat Government
has given its written approval of the proposed measure. Minister Kasche thinks it right to begin with the removal, and in fact to begin for the whole country. One could therefore take the risk of having difficulties develop in the course of the action, so far as concerns the zone occupied by Italians.
A report for the Reich Foreign Minister to this effect (D III 562 Secret) has been held up by State Secretary von Weizsaecker since he considered an inquiry should first be made at the Embassy in Rome. The answer has not been received.
The problem of the Italian Jews has come up in the same way in connection with the evacuation of the Jews in France.
Ambassador Abetz points out in connection with the deportation in preparation from the
Occupied French Territory that there was an urgent political interest to take the foreign Jews first in the evacuation measures. Since these Jews were regarded as foreign bodies they were already especially hated and passing them over and giving them thereby a quasi privileging would cause bad feeling, the more so since among them were to be found responsible instigators of Jewish terror and sabotage acts. It was regrettable that the Axis appeared exactly in this point to pursue no uniform policy.
If the evacuation of the foreign Jews were not immediately possible, the Italian Government
should be for the time being asked to repatriate their Jews from France.
On the Italian side economic interests appear to play a decisive role. The safeguarding of these interests however is [entir]ely possible, so that on this point there needs to be no obstacle to the planned solution.
On this question of the Italian Jews in France a conference record of 24 July, re D III 562 Secret, has been submitted to the Reich Foreign Minister.
On the occasion of a reception by the Reich Foreign Minister on 26 November 1941 the
Bulgarian Foreign Minister Popoff touched on the problem of according like treatment to the Jews of European nationalities and pointed out the difficulties that the Bulgarians had in the application of their Jewish laws to Jews of foreign nationality.
The Reich Foreign Minister answered that he thought this question brought up by Mr. Popoff
not uninteresting. Even now he could say one thing to him, that at the end of this war all Jews would have to leave Europe. This was an unalterable decision of the Fuehrer and also the only way to master this problem, as only a global and comprehensive solution could be applied and individual measures would not help very much. Furthermore, one should not attribute too much worth to the protests on behalf of the Jews of foreign nationality. At any rate, we would not let ourselves be taken in any further by such protests from the American side. He – the Reich Foreign Minister – would have the problem described by Mr. Popoff investigated by the Foreign Office.
The Reich Foreign Minister commissioned me to undertake the investigation promised
(compare D III 660g) (document NG-4669).
I should like to make reference to my basic conference memorandum of 4 December 1941, re D
III 660 Secret, which I am dispatching, together with the proper files. This conference memorandum was held up by the State Secretary, because he considered a further examination by the Legal Division first necessary. In their opinion the German-Bulgarian trade and shipping pact was not in agreement with the German-Bulgarian arrangements proposed by me. I therefore notified the German Legation in Sofia, re D III 497 Secret, under date of 19 June, in reference to the suggestion of the Bulgarian Foreign Minister Popoff at his reception to contact the Bulgarian Government and find out whether it was prepared to come
to an agreement in the Jewish problem that there should be no rights from the trade and shipping pact given effect in favor of the Jews in the piuiilisc [aaargh: purpose?] of reciprocality.
If the question is put from the Bulgarian side as to whether Germany is ready to deport Jews from Bulgaria to the east, the question should be answered in the affirmative but in respect to the time of the deporting should be answered evasively. This decree was cosigned by the State Secretary, the Under State Secretary, the Director of the Political Division, the Director of the Division for Economic Policy, Section IV of the Political Division, Section IV of the Division for Economic Policy, and also by Ribbentrop. The Legation exchanged notes with the Bulgarian Government and reported that the Bulgarian
Government is fundamentally prepared in the problem of the evacuation to sign an agreement with us, hereby the basis is given to include the Bulgarian Jews in the Jewish measures. (D III 559 Secret and 569 Secret).
The Hungarian Government has not yet been approached with respect to the Jewish removal,
because the status of the Hungarian legislation up to the present does not promise a sufficient success.
In accordance with the agreement of the Rumanian Government mentioned under 8 the evacuation of the Rumanian Jews from Germany and the occupied territories was begun, whereupon various Rumanian consulates and the Rumanian Minister in Berlin, who had no instructions from their Government, intervened. Ambassador von Killinger was therefore asked for clarification. The Legation seems to have made use of the Jewish advisor assigned to it, Richter, for this purpose. He is a person to whom the Rumanian Government confirmed its earlier agreement to the inclusion of the Rumanian Jews in the German measures and to whom the Deputy Ministry President Mihai Antonescu informed of the request of the Marshall that the German agencies should also carry out the removal from Rumania itself and should be then [aaargh: begin?] immediately with the transport of the Jews from the areas
Arad, Timisoara and Turda.
For details may I refer to my conference memorandum of 17 August ad D III 649. II. [aaargh: ?] At the request of the governments concerned, the legations in Bratislava, Zagreb and Bucharest have been assigned advisors for Jewish affairs. They have been made available at the request of the Foreign Office by the RSHA. Their assignment is for a limited time. It ends as soon as the Jewish problem in the country concerned can be regarded as solved in the German sense. Originally it was regarded as solved as soon as the country concerned had issued Jewish laws similar to the German ones. Accordingly Richter was recalled from Rumania last year by the RSHA. At the urgent request of the legation in
Bucharest, Richter was again assigned to the legation despite the objection of the RSHA. This was done with the express intention of having him remain there until the actual final solution in Rumania (D III 1703 Secret and 1893 Secret). . .
Since all negotiations with the Rumanian Government went through the Foreign Office, the
report of SS First Lieutenant Richter submitted by the Reichsfuehrer-SS should be considered only as an internal work report to the RSHA. The unusual procedure of having the confirmation of a final conference in the handwriting of the Deputy Minister President was sharply objected to immediately through the directive of the 17th of this month; the official handling of the affair must be carried out immediately. The files have been submitted there already under D III 659 Secret.
The intended deportations are a further step forward on the way of the total solution and are in respect to other countries (Hungary) very important. The deportation to the Government General is a temporary measure. The Jews will be moved on further to the occupied Eastern Territories as soon as the technical conditions for it are given.
I therefore request approval for the continuation of the negotiations and measures under these terms and according to the arrangement made.
Signed: LUTHER
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